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Abstract 
Little is known about how different bonus schemes affect traders’ propensity to trade and which 
bonus schemes improve traders’ performance. We study the effects of linear versus threshold 
(convex) bonus schemes on traders’ behavior. Traders purchase and sell shares in an experimental 
stock market on the basis of fundamental and technical information (evolution of the market index, 
past share price evolution, realized earnings, and analysts’ earnings forecasts). We find that traders 
trade more intensively (the number of transactions augments) under the threshold than under the 
linear bonus scheme. When market conditions are such that a higher profitability can be more easily 
reached, trading frequency only increases little under a threshold scheme, but the size of trades is 
significantly larger than in the case of market conditions with lower profitability. Furthermore, trading 
intensity significantly decreases when bonus thresholds are reached but only after building in a safety 
margin. Under the threshold scheme, the traders’ performance is lower (even when there are no 
transaction costs) than under the linear bonus scheme as a consequence of poorer market timing. This 
is especially the case when earning money by trading is relatively difficult (under low profitability 
conditions). Nevertheless, under low profitability conditions, traders seem to collect more information 
about the relationships between share price and market returns, earnings, and earnings forecasts, apply 
more effort to understand those relationships, and finally show better performance.  
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1 Introduction 
 
The role of compensation schemes as a device to reduce agency costs has raised 
academic eyebrows over the last fifteen years (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). The recent financial 
crisis has intensified this criticism not only in the academic literature but also on the part of 
investors and regulators. Public opinion is reflected in the observation of Timothy Geithner, 
the former US Treasury Secretary: “This financial crisis had many significant causes, but 
executive compensation practices were a contributing factor. Incentives for short term gains 
overwhelmed the checks and balances meant to mitigate against the risk of excess leverage” 
(Geithner, 2009). Whereas the relationship between the level and form of executive 
compensation and company performance has frequently been studied, little is known about 
how compensation packages and bonus schemes actually create incentives for traders.  
Bonus schemes seem to play an eminent role in traders’ motivation to trade and to 
perform well. Sometimes they evoke emotions, aspirations, and risk appetites that result in 
aberrant behavior, e.g., in the cases of Nick Leeson, Jérôme Kerviel, and Kweku Adoboli, 
whose fraudulent behavior cost their employers around Euro 8 billion. “Yes, I did it – but all I 
wanted was a bonus,” commented Jérôme Kerviel on his trading loss of Euro 4.9 billion for 
Societe Generale (The Independent and The Times, 29 Oct. 2008). In a similar vein, Nick 
Leeson commented “I suppose, I became indoctrinated by the lure of the salaries that were 
available and the whispered rumours of bonuses that were available” (Journal.ie, 19 Oct. 
2011). These examples show that a misalignment of the interests of individuals and their 
employers (be it mutual funds, unit trusts, banks, pension funds, or corporations) may lead to 
severe problems. It is likely that specific compensation schemes induce suboptimal trading 
behavior that may ultimately lead to poor performance and significant corporate losses.  
However, still little is known about how bonus schemes affect traders’ propensity to trade 
and which bonus schemes improve traders’ performance.  
To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the influence of bonus schemes 
on traders’ willingness to trade and on their performance. In contrast, a considerable number 
of studies have been made on fund managers’ (but not on traders’ incentives). A broad 
literature postulates a convex relationship between fund managers’ compensation and funds’ 
past performance through new money inflows and investigates fund managers’ response to 
those incentives (Kempf, Ruenzi, & Thiele 2009; Farnsworth & Taylor 2006; Chevalier and 
Ellison 1997). Although from a theoretical perspective convex compensation schemes should 
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lead to higher risk taking and higher profits compared to linear ones, Coval and Shumway 
(2005) and Liu et al. (2010) find that higher risk-taking does not result in higher returns for 
professional traders and market makers. 
Traders’ bonus schemes may serve roles other than inducing traders to higher risk-
taking. For example, they may be designed to increase trading intensity. This would be 
particularly relevant if a professional market maker would earn higher profits by placing 
more trades or larger trades. However, empirical evidence suggests that such strategies also 
do not necessarily lead to increased performance. Indeed, Garvey and Wu (2010) document 
that for professional traders higher trading activity on the last day of their evaluation period 
results in poorer performance due to higher transaction costs and poor market timing. 
Likewise, Barber and Odean (2000, 2001) demonstrate that for individual investors higher 
trading activity is likely to result in poorer performance due to higher transaction costs. 
To investigate how traders react to different incentive schemes, we set up an 
experiment to study trading behavior under controlled market conditions. Specifically, we 
study trading intensity and performance. We compare the impact of two different bonus 
schemes: (i) a linear scheme, which we use as benchmark and always pays a fixed percentage 
of the total profit; and (ii) a threshold scheme, which is frequently used in the industry and 
pays an increased percentage of the total profit as each threshold is reached (after which the 
payment increases linearly until the next threshold is reached). Linear, but especially 
threshold bonus schemes are widely used by banks and funds, but the amounts, thresholds, 
and other details seem strictly confidential.2  
In a wider context, our study relates to the literature on the effects of incentives on 
performance in psychology and economics. In their overview based on 131 experimental 
papers, Bonner et al. (2000) show that quota schemes are the most likely to evoke positive 
incentive effects, such as higher effort levels or higher performance. A quota scheme is an 
example of a threshold scheme; it pays a lump-sum amount once a certain performance level 
is reached, i.e., it involves a specific goal. In terms of providing incentives to improve 
performance, threshold schemes are followed by linear ones, tournaments, and fixed-rate 
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 We have verified that our bonus schemes are realistic. Directors and traders of UBS, Goldman Sachs, JP 
Morgan, Meryll Lynch, and Deutsche Bank London stated that the thresholds and degree of profit sharing not 
only depend on the individual performance of the traders but also on their seniority, hierarchical rank, and the 
profitability of the department, division, and firm. They have confirmed that our schemes do make sense and are 
used in practice, although they were not willing to provide details or give examples of the threshold values or 
profit-sharing rules used in their companies. 
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schemes3. Importantly, none of the papers considered by Bonner et al. (2000) deals with 
trading activity or market participation; the studies in their literature survey on incentive 
schemes consider relatively simple tasks such as recalling words or solving arithmetical 
problems with no risk or uncertainty involved. In contrast, Kohlmeyer and Drake (2009) find 
that in a financial decision-making context threshold a bonus scheme does not increase risk-
taking in new project selection relative to a linear bonus scheme. Our study focuses on 
trading, a simultaneously risky and effort-eliciting activity. So we conjecture that a threshold 
bonus scheme is likely to increase (relative to a linear bonus scheme) the level of effort 
exercised by traders, which increases their trading intensity.  
Conjecture 1 Trading intensity is higher under the threshold than under the linear bonus 
scheme. 
According to Heath, Larrick, and Wu (1999), threshold goals may serve as reference 
points. Thus, the trading performance should be evaluated in accordance with the value 
function of a corresponding reference point as suggested by prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Accordingly, outcomes below the goal are coded by a trader as losses and 
those above the goal as gains. Loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity result in high trading 
intensity and risk-seeking below the goal and low trading intensity and risk aversion above 
the goal. Thus, once the threshold is reached, the pressure to perform well decreases 
significantly and as a result trading intensity drops.  
Conjecture 2 Once a bonus scheme threshold is met, trading intensity decreases. 
In contrast to the above benefits of threshold bonus schemes, the behavioral literature 
suggests that the requirement to reach specific performance thresholds may lead to 
suboptimal decision making. Kohn (1993) writes: “Do rewards motivate people? Absolutely! 
They motivate people to get rewards.” In other words, the threshold may itself become a 
target at the expense of the actual target, which is to make optimal trading decisions. 
Moreover, Bonner et al. (2000) and Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) find that incentives are less 
likely to improve performance in difficult tasks or in tasks where the gap between task 
difficulty and subjects’ skill is substantial. Trading in the stock market is a difficult task, 
which requires significant mental effort to detect information related to future stock 
performance. Hence, we argue that while the threshold bonus scheme may induce higher 
                                                           
3Under linear schemes every piece of output is rewarded with an equal payment; in tournaments the winner gets 
all while the others get nothing; and under fixed-rate schemes the payment does not depend on performance. 
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effort, it may fail to improve performance. Thus, their performance may suffer from 
excessive trading.  
Conjecture 3 Under the threshold bonus scheme, traders harm their performance by 
trading more (even when transaction costs are zero). 
The previous literature suggests that past market4 returns significantly affect investor 
behavior (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007; Statman, Thorley & Vonkink, 2006; Glaser & Weber, 
2009; Shi & Wang, 2010). Moreover, high performance of specific stocks may catch 
investors’ attention and result in higher trading activity in those stocks (Cooper, Dimitrov, & 
Rau, 2001; Bae & Wang, 2012). In our experiment subjects trade only one stock and if it 
performs well then they may expect higher future returns which would subsequently augment 
trading intensity, transaction frequency and transaction size.5 To assess the impact of the 
market conditions, we vary the stock profitability in our experiment (high vs. low 
profitability conditions). Under high profitability conditions it is relatively easy to earn 
money as average share price returns of the experimental stock are high, whereas under low 
profitability conditions returns are lower and only elaborated trading strategies may result in 
good performance. 
Conjecture 4 Trading intensity is higher under favorable market conditions.  
We employ a two (bonus scheme: linear vs. threshold) by two (session profitability: 
low vs. high) between-subject experimental design. The linear bonus scheme always pays a 
fixed percentage of the profit earned by traders as their bonus. The threshold bonus scheme is 
piecewise linear; it sets two explicit performance goals at which a higher bonus and a steeper 
performance-bonus relationship can be reached. In particular, under the high-profitability 
conditions the lower threshold is relatively easy to reach, whereas under the low-profitability 
conditions, the same threshold is relatively difficult to attain.  
We report a set of interesting results. First, under the threshold bonus scheme the 
traders trade more intensively than under the linear one. Moreover, under the former scheme, 
trading intensity significantly depends on whether or not a threshold is reached. Trading 
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 In addition, it has been shown that traders credit themselves for success and positive performance, while 
attributing failures and negative performance to external factors such as bad luck or others’ mistakes. This 
inevitably leads to overconfidence in trading skills as the self-attribution bias prevents investors from making an 
objective assessment of their abilities and the resulting performance (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 
1998; Gervais & Odean, 2001).  
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intensity declines once a threshold is met; this effect is especially strong for the higher 
threshold. Although the threshold bonus scheme leads to higher trading intensity, it fails to 
induce higher performance. Indeed, the quality of the investment decisions and the final 
performance are significantly lower under the threshold than under the linear scheme. In our 
experiment, trading was costless, so the lower returns earned under the threshold scheme 
cannot be explained by transaction costs. We argue that reaching a threshold may itself 
become a target at the expense of optimal trading decisions. Thus, bonuses may be 
detrimental for performance at least in comparison with linear compensation schemes.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
experimental design and provides a detailed description of the two bonus schemes. Section 3 
presents the results, and Section 4 concludes. 
2 Experimental Design 
 
During fifty experimental trading rounds the participants in our experiment (whom we 
will call traders henceforth) acted as the employees of a trading company (see Appendix A 
for the experimental instructions). They bought and sold shares of a particular stock and were 
provided with technical and fundamental information about the company and the market (the 
past evolution of the share price, the company’s past earnings, the analysts’ earnings 
forecasts, and the evolution of the market index). All this information consists of real data on 
the US company Praxair, Inc.6 and on the US S&P500 market index. The data processes were 
linearly rescaled and Praxair’s name was substituted by a neutral company name so that the 
traders would not be able to identify the firm nor the time period. The information about 
changes in earnings and analysts’ earnings forecasts was given every third trading round 
(since Praxair reports on a quarterly basis and the share price and market data are on a 
monthly basis). The stock did not pay dividends and we did not provide a bid-ask spread to 
make sure that transaction costs were zero. The traders were price takers and they were 
explicitly told in the instructions that their decisions did not influence stock price and other 
variables.  
The traders started the first round without holding any shares but with an endowment 
of E$500 (experimental dollars) in cash. At the beginning of every subsequent trading round, 
                                                           
6
 We chose a company for which information on the earnings, analysts’ forecasts, and share price performance 
was available for at least ten years. Moreover, the share price process did not experience sharp ups-and-downs 
and was characterized by a period with a prolonged upward movement and a period with a lower trend. 
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the traders received an additional E$100 in cash to ensure that they would have sufficient 
resources for trading. We thus enabled them to make investment decisions over the whole 
time span of the trading session. The total amount of cash received by each trader during the 
fifty rounds of the trading session was E$5,400.  
Every round, traders chose how many stock shares to buy or sell (but short selling was 
not allowed). In each round, the traders had 15 seconds to make their investment decisions; 
pre-testing showed that this interval was sufficient to make trading decisions. If a trader did 
not react within the given time span, a new round started, the share holdings remained 
unchanged and the cash holdings increased with an additional endowment of E$100. At the 
end of every round, traders’ cumulative performance was displayed; every trader could see 
only his or her own performance but not that of others.  
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, z-Tree: Zurich 
toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, 2007) and all the experimental sessions took 
place at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. The traders were undergraduate or graduate 
students (invited via the university website) who had previously indicated their interest in 
participating in paid experiments. A total of 123 students participated in the experiment: 64 
females and 59 males, with an average age of 23 years. 
 
Bonus schemes 
At the beginning of the experiment, the traders were randomly assigned to one of two bonus 
schemes. Under the linear scheme, the traders always received 35% of the total profit. Figure 
1a shows the bonus paid under the linear scheme as a function of the total return earned at the 
end of fifty rounds.  
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 1 around here] 
Table 1 and Figure 1b show the bonus paid under the threshold scheme. If the trader’s 
total return at the end of the trading session under the threshold bonus scheme was between 0 
and 25%, she received 25% of the total profit. If the total return was between 25% and 45%, 
she received 35%, and if the total return exceeded 45%, she received 45%. Thus, the above 
two thresholds served as implicit performance targets for the traders. 
Both linear and threshold bonus schemes reward positive performance but do not 
punish for negative returns as a trader is simply not paid any bonus if her total return is below 
zero. Here we follow the tradition held in industry where traders’ punishment for negative 
8 
performance is absence of bonus payment. Obviously, in cases of extreme losses traders 
would face a higher probability of being fired, but in the current study we do not consider 
employment incentives for traders to keep things simple. 
Note also that under the linear scheme non-trading does not result in a reduction in the 
absolute amount paid as a bonus. In other words, if a trader considers the bonus earned to be 
sufficiently high and does not want to take further risks, she can sell all available shares and 
secure the bonus paid at the end of the trading session7. This strategy is not feasible under the 
threshold scheme if a trader is above a threshold. Because the trader receives additional cash 
at the beginning of every round, no trading decreases her total return (expressed as a 
percentage of the total cash received) and hence the part of the total profit she will receive as 
bonus.  
The final bonus was determined only by the trader’s performance at the end of fifty 
rounds and by the type of bonus scheme (linear or threshold). The final bonus was paid to the 
traders privately and in cash at the rate of 1 Euro for every E$50.8 Thus, only the total return 
achieved at the end of the fifty round trading session determined the amount of money traders 
took home after the experiment; none of the intermediate performance results directly 
affected the final payment. 
 
High and low share price returns 
At the beginning of the experiment, the traders were randomly assigned to one of two trading 
sessions that differed in terms of the average profitability of the traded stock. The stock-price 
process was more favorable in the “high stock return” (HighSR) session, with an average 
share price return of 2.35% per round.  In the “low stock return” (LowSR) session, the 
average share price return was 0.82% per round. Table 2 compares the share price behavior in 
the HighSR and LowSR sessions; the average share price return session was 2.8 times larger 
in the HighSR than that in the LowSR session. During the HighSR session the share price 
increased by 183.39%, whereas the increase was merely 24.12% in the LowSR session. In 
other words, E$1 invested in the stock in the first trading round would be worth E$2.83 at the 
end of the HighSR session but only E$1.24 at the end of the LowSR session.  
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 Under the linear scheme, Bonus = Profit x 35%, where Profit is the difference between the cash and stock 
holdings and the investment received. Under the threshold scheme, Bonus = Profit x K%, where K depends on 
the total return earned. 
8
 To ensure that all participants had a fair chance on a similar payoff, the bonus schemes were created in such a 
way that a random trading pattern would yield about the same payoff.  
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[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Taking bonus scheme and profitability conditions together, the traders were randomly 
assigned to one of four treatments: linear bonus scheme and low stock return session 
(LinLow); linear bonus scheme and high stock return session (LinHigh); threshold bonus 
scheme and low stock return session (ThresLow); and  threshold bonus scheme and high 
stock return session (ThresHigh; see Table 3). We performed between-subject comparisons of 
the four treatments to identify how bonus scheme and share price profitability influence the 
trading behavior of traders. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
3 Results 
 
We structure the presentation of our results as follows: we start by analyzing trading 
intensity, which will subsequently be dissected into two dimensions (transaction frequency 
and transaction size). We then analyze the impact of bonus schemes, and of the profitability 
of the traded stock on trading activity. Next, we turn to a multivariate analysis of trading 
intensity which controls for the impact of trading information and traders’ characteristics. 
Finally, we focus on traders’ performance and perform robustness checks.   
3.1 Trading intensity  
In every round, we calculate for each trader the maximum number of shares she can buy and 
sell. The maximum number for sale is the number of shares the trader holds as short selling is 
not allowed; the maximum number she can buy equals her cash holdings divided by the 
current share price. To test conjecture 1, we create a dependent variable called Trading 
Intensity, which is defined as the sum of two ratios: the number of shares bought divided by 
the maximum number of shares that could be bought plus the number of shares sold divided 
by the maximum number of shares that could be sold: 
Trading Intensity  Number of shares boughtMax. number of shares could be bought  Number of shares soldMax. number of shares could be sold 
If in the current round a trader neither buys nor sells shares then the Trading Intensity 
is zero (see Appendix B for detailed definitions of the variables). We assume that trading 
intensity reflects traders’ beliefs about future share price development. For example, if the 
trader strongly believes that the share price will go up in the next round, she is likely to buy 
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as many shares as she can in the current round and her trading intensity would equal 100%. 
The trader would sell all her shares if she expects the share price to decrease in the next 
round. When the trader expects the share price to rise or fall with equal probability, then she 
will neither buy nor sell shares and will wait until the next round when more information 
arrives9. 
Table 4 and Figure 2 compare the four treatments in terms of average Trading 
Intensity. On average, 51.59% of the available shares were traded every round. There is a 
significant difference in average trading intensity under the linear and threshold bonus 
schemes (column 2 of Table 4, Panel A), and in the HighSR and LowSR sessions (row 2 of 
Table 4, Panel A). In accordance with conjecture 1, the more trading occurred under the 
threshold than under the linear bonus scheme, with the difference amounting to 4.60% (t = 
4.15, p < 0.01). Moreover, this difference stays almost the same when the LowSR and 
HighSR sessions are considered separately: 4.62% (t = 2.92, p < 0.01) in the LowSR session 
and 4.28% (t = 2.77, p < 0.05) in the HighSR session (bottom row of Table 4, Panel A). 
These results confirm Conjecture 1 in that the trading intensity is significantly higher under 
the threshold scheme than under the linear one. 
In accordance with conjecture 4, trading intensity in the HighSR session was 
significantly higher than in the LowSR session. Indeed, the difference in average trading 
intensity between the HighSR and LowSR sessions is 7.03% (t = 6.33, p < 0.01). Moreover, 
this difference between the profitability conditions does not depend on the bonus scheme: the 
difference amounts to 7.09% (t = 4.46, p < 0.01) and 6.75% (t = 4.36, p < 0.01) for the linear 
and the threshold bonus schemes, respectively. An ANOVA also reveals no significant 
interactions between type of bonus scheme and stock profitability conditions (Table 4, Panel 
B).  
Thus, we conclude that the threshold bonus scheme induces higher trading intensity 
and that higher profitability opportunities also lead to more intensive trading. 
[Insert Table 4 and Figure 2 around here] 
To investigate further what drives the differences in trading intensity between the 
treatments, we partition Trading Intensity into Transaction Frequency and Transaction Size. 
The former is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a trader buys or sells shares in the current 
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 In real life, investors have other reasons to trade, including liquidity needs and tax considerations. However, 
these issues are not relevant in the present experimental setting. 
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round (i.e., if a transaction takes place) and 0 otherwise. Transaction Size is defined only for 
those rounds in which a trader buys or sells shares (i.e., when Transaction Frequency equals 
1).  
 !"#$ %&'(&!)  * 1, when a participant buys or sells any number of shares0, otherwise                                                                                    0 
 !"#$ 1#2&   
34
5 Number of shares boughtMax. number of shares could be bought , when a participant buys sharesNumber of shares soldMax. number of shares could be sold , when a participant sells shares
0
 
Table 5 and Figure 3 compare the four treatments in terms of average Transaction 
Frequency per trading session (of fifty rounds). The traders sold and purchased shares in 
more than 79% of the trading rounds. . While there was no difference in transaction 
frequency between high and low profitability sessions, there was a clear difference under the 
linear and threshold schemes.  The transaction frequency is significantly higher (by 6.88% 
with t = 6.66 and p < 0.01) under the threshold than under the linear scheme (column 2 of 
Table 5, Panel A). The difference in transaction frequency under the two schemes provides 
additional support for conjecture 1. Next, we compare transaction frequency between 
schemes separately in the LowSR session (treatments LinLow and ThresLow) and the 
HighSR session (treatments LinHigh and ThresHigh). In both sessions, transaction frequency 
was higher in the threshold than the linear scheme (LowSR: 9.51%, t = 6.29, p < 0.01, 
column 3 of Table 5, Panel A; HighSR: 4.60%, t = 3.26, p < 0.01, column 4 of Table 5, Panel 
A). Since the information set was the same under both bonus schemes, the higher transaction 
frequency was presumably driven by the pressure to reach the implicit goals under the 
threshold scheme. This pressure seems to be especially high when the opportunities for good 
performance are limited, i.e., in the LowSR session. An ANOVA analysis (Table 5, Panel B) 
confirms a significant interaction effect between bonus-scheme type and stock profitability (p 
< 0.05). Figure 3 presents a graphical analysis of the transaction frequency under the four 
treatments. Thus, Table 5 and Figure 3 combined provide evidence supporting conjecture 1, 
namely that the threshold scheme induces more aggressive trading behavior in the form of 
higher transaction frequency. Moreover, contrary to conjecture 4, Transaction Frequency was 
not affected by profitability conditions. 
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 3 around here] 
Table 6 and Figure 4 present the Transaction Size by treatment. On average, traders 
traded around 65.19% of the number of shares available (conditional on a transaction taking 
12 
place). We unveil that transaction size does not depend on the type of bonus scheme. 
However, the average Transaction Size is positively related to the profitability of the trading 
sessions. In the LowSR session trading amounted to 60.46% of the available shares, which is 
8.81% less than in the HighSR session (69. 27%; t = 7.91, p < 0.01). The difference in 
Transaction Size between HighSR and LowSR session shows up for both bonus schemes; it 
amounts to 7.31% (t = 4.51, p < 0.01) and 10.14% (t = 6.65, p < 0.01) for the linear and 
threshold scheme, respectively. To sum up, under favorable profitability conditions the 
traders invested a higher percentage of their wealth in the stock. This result supports 
conjecture 4, suggesting that we primarily find support for conjecture 4 in terms of 
transaction size rather than frequency. 
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 4 around here] 
To conclude this section, we find that in our experiment trading activity was 
significantly higher under the threshold than under the linear scheme in terms of average 
share turnover and average transaction frequency. By extension, the results suggest that 
increased trading frequency may be caused not only by traders’ overconfidence (Barber & 
Odean, 2001) or past individual performance (Grinblatt & Keloharju 2001; Statman, Thorley, 
& Vorkink, 2006; Glaser & Weber, 2009; Nicolosi, Peng, & Zhu, 2009) but also by the type 
of bonus scheme. In contrast, the average transaction size was affected only by profitability 
conditions, but not by the type of bonus scheme.  
3.2 Trading intensity around bonus thresholds 
To investigate how trading behavior changes around the thresholds and to test conjecture 2, 
we plot the average transaction frequency10 against the total return earned by the traders. We 
divide the total return values into intervals of five percentage points, starting from a negative 
performance of -5%. Then, we calculate the mean and standard deviation of the variable 
Transaction Frequency under the linear and threshold schemes for each interval. Finally, we 
depict these means and their 95% confidence intervals by performance interval to obtain a 
histogram of probabilities that transactions are made for different total returns (Figure 5). 
Figure 5a shows, as expected, that there are no significant differences between the average 
transaction frequencies across the total return intervals11 under the linear scheme.  
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 We use the average transaction frequency instead of the trading intensity because we showed in the previous 
section that the transaction frequency is affected by the type of bonus scheme but not by the profitability 
conditions.  
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 The 95% confidence intervals of the transaction frequency are especially wide for very high (above 70%) and 
very low (below -5%) performance because of the small number of observations.  
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Under the threshold scheme the behavior changes significantly once the thresholds are 
met (Figure 5b). In accordance with conjecture 2, after reaching a threshold, the traders made 
significantly fewer transactions. Interestingly, the mean number of transactions does not drop 
immediately after the threshold (i.e. in the [25%, 30%], [45%, 50%] intervals), but in the 
adjacent intervals ([30%, 35%], [50% 55%]). This implies that the traders applied a 5% 
safety margin above the threshold, before they decreased their transaction frequency12. The 
average transaction frequency is 0.83 on the whole range of the total return interval [-5%, 
70%]. Once the 45% threshold is passed, this frequency drops to 0.57 (t = 5.74, p < 0.01) in 
the [50%, 55%] interval. For the 25% threshold, we observe a similar effect: the transaction 
frequency decreases from 0.83 in [-5%, 70%] to 0.76 in the [30%, 35%] interval. Although 
the decrease is clearly significant (t = 2.38, p < 0.05), it is less pronounced, probably because 
of the incentives created by the next performance threshold (at 45%).  
[Insert Figure 5 around here] 
   
3.3 Trading intensity in a multivariate setting. 
We analyze the influence of bonus schemes and stock-price profitability on trading behavior 
by investigating the transaction intensity, frequency, and size in a multivariate setting: 
Y  α  β9ThresBS  β<HighSR  β?ThresBS@HighSR  ∑γCThreshold VariableC
 ∑θFInformation VariableF  ∑δHTraderIs CharacteristicsH   ε                                         L1M 
In the equation above, Y stands respectively for Trading Intensity, Transaction 
Frequency, and Transaction Size. As the main explanatory variables we employ the type of 
bonus scheme (the dummy variable ThresBS), the type of stock profitability of the trading 
session (the dummy variable HighSR), and their interaction term (ThresBS × HighSR) to 
capture the effects of the bonus scheme and stock-return profitability on the various 
                                                           
12
 As previously noted, under the threshold scheme, new endowments deteriorate the returns. For example: a 
trader’s total return equals 30%. After selling the shares she has 130% of her investment in cash (e.g. E$700) at 
round t. As of the next round (t+1), she adopts a passive strategy and no longer invests; she receives an additional 
investment of E$100, such that her total return is 30%*E$700/(E$700+E$100) = 26.25% < 30%. At (t+2), the 
return is 30%*E$700/(E$700+E$200)= 23.33%. Under the threshold bonus scheme, the bonus depends on the 
total return earned. If the trading session would end at (t+1), she would receive a bonus of 35% or E$245 but if 
the end is at (t+2), she would only receive a bonus of 25% or E$175. Thus, a passive strategy of no trading can 
erode the bonus. Hence, to consolidate their positions, traders under the threshold scheme better only reduce their 
trading activity after exceeding a threshold with a safety margin (which is here empirically 5%). In contrast, 
under linear bonus scheme, the bonus depends only on the additional money earned, so the trader’s bonus equals 
35%·E$700 = E$245.  
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dimensions of trading activity. To further test conjecture 2 we include several threshold 
variables, namely dummies for the post-threshold return intervals, Return [30%, 35%] and 
Return [50%, 55%], and their interaction terms with ThresBS. For example, Return [30%, 
35%] equals 1 if the total return earned by a trader so far falls into the interval [30%, 35%]. 
To match the traders’ strategy we use a safety margin of 5% to determine the above intervals.  
In the above equation, we add as controls the information variables (most recent stock return 
prior to a trade, the market return, the earnings, and the earnings’ forecasts), and traders’ 
characteristics (such as risk aversion, the average percentage of trader’s total wealth invested 
in stock, her total return to date, and the change in her total return to date since the last round) 
(see appendix B for definitions). 
To control for the information available to traders, we include the most recent share 
price return at the time of the transaction, the market return, earnings announcements, and 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. Moreover, we also control for traders’ characteristics, such as 
the total return earned by a trader from the beginning of the trading session to the current 
round (Total Return to Date) and change in her total return since the last round (Change in 
Total Return). Because higher risk aversion is likely to decrease trading intensity13, we 
include in the regression analysis a measure of traders’ risk attitude:  the average percentage 
of a trader’s wealth invested in the stock (Average % in Stock). This variable is a proxy for 
traders’ risk attitudes since more risk tolerant traders are more likely to invest more into the 
risky asset14.  
Trading intensity, propensity, and size 
For the dependent variable Trading Intensity, we estimate a Tobit model, because short 
selling and borrowing cash were not allowed in our experimental setting. Models (1) and (2) 
of Table 7 estimate the influence of the type of bonus scheme and stock profitability on the 
trading intensity. We confirm that under the threshold scheme a higher percentage of shares 
is traded: in models (1) and (2) the coefficient on ThresBS variable is positive and significant 
at 1% level. The thresholds under this scheme negatively affect the trading intensity once 
they are achieved with a sufficient safety margin (see model (2)). The coefficients on the 
interaction terms Return [30%, 35%] x ThresBS, and Return [50%, 55%] x ThresBS are all 
negative and significant (t = 2.10, p < 0.05 and t = 2.86, p < 0.01). Moreover, trading 
                                                           
13
 Odean (1998) and Hirshleifer and Luo (2001) mainly consider the effect of overconfidence on trading 
behavior. However, after controlling for overconfidence it can be shown that in their models trading volume 
decreases with greater risk aversion. 
14
 As an alternative control for risk aversion we also used Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) measure, which did not 
influence our main results. 
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intensity decreases further once the second 45% threshold is passed: the coefficient on Return 
[50%, 55%] x ThresBS is almost twice as large in absolute value as the coefficient on Return 
[30%, 35%] x ThresBS. Note that the same intervals under the linear scheme do not have any 
significant influence on the trading intensity (Return [30%, 35%] and Return [50%, 55%] are 
not significant). 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
To further assess how bonus-scheme types and profitability conditions influence 
trading activity, we dissect trading intensity into the propensity to trade (transaction 
frequency) (logit models (3) and (4) of Table 7) and transaction size (models (5) and (6). The 
ThresBS dummy is positive and significant (for models (3) and (4), the p-values are below 
1%), suggesting that the traders are more likely to trade under the threshold than under the 
linear scheme. We confirm that trading frequency significantly decreases when a threshold is 
passed with a 5% safety margin: the coefficients on Return [30%, 35%] x ThresBS, and 
Return [50%, 55%] x ThresBS are both negative and significant at the 5% level (t = 2.60, p < 
0.01 and t = 2.41, p < 0.05). We also find a significantly negative interaction effect between 
bonus scheme type and profitability conditions: the coefficient on ThresBS x HighSR is 
negative and significant (for model (3) with t = 2.10, p < 0.05). So, whereas the probability to 
make a transaction was higher under the threshold than under linear scheme, this effect was 
moderated under high profitability conditions (see also Fig. 3). The combined effect of 
threshold scheme and high profitability conditions is significantly positive (χ2 = 11.80, p < 
0.01). However, this effect disappears once we include the thresholds in the regression in 
model (4). 
Tobit regressions with Transaction Size as a dependent variable are presented in Table 
7 (models (5) and (6)). Surprisingly, the threshold scheme does not affect the transaction size: 
the ThresBS coefficient is not significant in models (5) and (6). However, we find a 
significantly positive interaction effect between ThresBS and HighSR: the coefficient on 
Thresh x HighSR is positive and significant at the 5% level (see also Fig.4). Thus, the 
threshold bonus scheme increases transaction size only in the HighSR session. Finally, 
whereas the coefficient on Return [30%, 35%] x ThresBS becomes insignificant the lower 
threshold of 25% has no impact on the transaction size, the transaction size is still influenced 
by the 45% threshold. The coefficient on Return [50%, 55%] x ThresBS is negative and 
significant (t = 1.96, p = 0.05).  
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The impact of information and traders’ characteristics on trading intensity 
While Return to Date does not affect trading intensity and its components (Transaction 
Frequency and Transaction Size), Change in Total Return influences traders’ propensity to 
trade (see models (1)-(2) and (5)-(6)). More specifically, if the total return earned by traders’ 
in the current round in higher than in the previous one, then trading intensity decreases mostly 
because traders start trading smaller stakes: the coefficient on Change in Total Return is 
negative and significant at the 5% level – models (1)-(2) and (5)-(6). This result is in line 
with predictions from prospect theory that people tend to become more (less) risk averse 
when their performance is above (below) their reference point (the previous round 
performance in our case). 
The share of a trader’s wealth invested in stocks (Average % in Stock), which could 
be seen as a proxy for risk tolerance in the investment domain, is positively related to trading 
intensity (both transaction frequency and size). So traders with higher risk tolerance traded 
more frequently and at higher stakes: the coefficient on Average % in Stock is positive and 
significant for all models (1)-(6).  
The influence of the information variables is in line with our expectations. It seems 
that the participants were using technical rather fundamental information: Stock Return and 
Market Return have a positive and strongly significant effect on trading intensity and its two 
dimensions (frequency and size), whereas earnings and their forecast did not affect trading 
behavior. 
 
3.4 Performance 
In the previous sections, we have shown that under the threshold bonus scheme traders traded 
more actively than under the linear one. On the one hand, there are reasons why one could 
expect that higher trading intensity under the threshold scheme does not necessarily result in 
poor performance. For example, the desire to earn more money and to reach thresholds may 
make people think harder, estimate market opportunities better, and finally make better 
decisions. On the other hand, increased transaction frequency may result in lower 
performance due to higher transaction costs (Barber & Odean, 2000, 2001), mediocre stock 
picking (Shi & Wang, 2010), or inferior market timing (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007). Our 
experimental market contains only one stock (i.e., does not allow for stock picking) and does 
not involve any transaction costs. Hence, our set-up enables us to study the effect of the 
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bonus scheme type on market timing. To this effect, we compare the quality of the trading 
decisions under the different bonus schemes. 
To maximize their final personal payoff, the traders needed to maximize their return at 
the end of the trading session of 50 rounds. Since the share did not pay dividends and short 
selling was not possible in our experiment, the strategy “buy low and sell high” was the only 
one that could provide positive returns. Traders could try to implement this strategy by 
buying stocks before the share price went up and by selling them before the share price went 
down. To estimate the quality of the trading decisions, we calculate the difference in the 
share price returns after stock share were bought and sold. If this difference is positive on 
average, the traders made good investments and on average correctly predicted/guessed the 
share price movements.  
We calculate the difference in the returns as follows. First, we calculate an average 
purchase-based return. For all the rounds in which a trader has bought shares, we calculate an 
average next-round stock return, i.e., we sum all the next-round stock-price returns for the 
rounds in which a trader bought shares and divide that sum by the total number of rounds in 
which shares were bought. Then, using the same procedure, we compute an average sale-
based stock-price return and subtract it from the average purchase-based stock return. The 
deduction we call Return Difference. 
Return DifferenceO   ∑ PStock ReturnRS9|BUC  1V W ∑ PStock ReturnUS9|BUC  0VUU   
where BUC is 1 when trader i buys shares and 0 when she sells shares. Conjecture 3 states that 
under the threshold scheme traders make poorer investment decisions because of the pressure 
to reach the targets. This effect must be especially prominent in the LowSR session when it is 
more difficult to reach the thresholds and the pressure to perform higher. Table 8 compares 
the four treatments in terms of average Return Difference. 
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
Table 8 shows that on average traders make significantly poorer investment decisions 
under the threshold scheme than under the linear scheme (column 2 of Table 8). The average 
difference in share price returns after buying and selling shares is 1.58% under the linear 
scheme, whereas it is only 0.36% under the threshold scheme. The difference between the 
two values is positive (1.22%) and significant (t = 2.69, p < 0.01). This pattern holds in both 
profitability sessions: in the LowSR session the difference between the average share price 
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purchase-based and sale-based returns is 1.42% higher under the linear than under the 
threshold bonus scheme (t = 2.00, p < 0.05). In the HighSR session, the average Return 
Difference under the linear bonus scheme exceeds the one under the threshold bonus scheme 
by only 0.98% and this difference is weakly significant (t = 1.74, p < 0.10). Thus, under the 
threshold scheme, the traders did not make better investment decisions than under the linear 
scheme. On the contrary, their attention to the implicit targets and the pressure to perform 
well has made them worse investors, which supports conjecture 3. As a robustness check, we 
calculated a volume-based difference in returns whereby the next round return after a 
purchase (sale) is multiplied by the percentage of shares bought (sold) and conclude that the 
results remain virtually unchanged (not reported here).  
The difference between the average purchase-based and sale-based returns in the 
LowSR session is 1.58% and in the HighSR session is 0.43% (Row 2 of Table 8). This 
implies that the two profitability conditions are statistically distinct in terms of the quality of 
traders’ investment decisions (t = 2.50, p < 0.05). In the LowSR session, the traders made 
better decisions: they bought shares before the share price went up and they sold shares 
before the share price went down. Thus, when earning money by trading was relatively 
difficult, the traders may have collected more information about the relationships between the 
share price and the market returns, earnings, and earnings forecasts, applied more effort to 
understand those relationships, and they finally performed better. In contrast, under high 
profitability conditions, they seemed to merely chase high returns. Previous research has 
shown similar patterns in investors’ behavior during bull and bear markets: Japanese and 
Chinese investors made inferior investment decisions during bull markets in comparison with 
bear markets due to poorer market timing and stock selection (Kim & Nofsinger, 2007; Shi & 
Wang, 2010). A comparable result was found for mutual fund investors across the business 
cycle (Cederburg, 2008). 
The above results are based on the returns calculated after the trade. We now evaluate 
the actual average performance obtained over the entire trading session. Did traders under the 
threshold scheme do better? Were they able to exploit the different share price profitability 
conditions? To answer these questions we compare the final returns earned by the traders at 
the end of the trading session of 50 rounds between the four treatments (see Table 9). We use 
the Final Total Return variable which is defined as Total Return to Date at the 50th round. If 
we pool the observations from the two profitability sessions, the difference in final returns 
between the two bonus schemes is insignificant (column 2 Table 9). In the LowSR session 
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(column 3 Table 9), the average return at the end of 50th round under the linear scheme equals 
14.70%, which is significantly higher (difference = 5.78%, t = 1.84, p < 0.10) than the Final 
Total Return under the threshold bonus scheme (8.92%). In contrast, this difference becomes 
insignificant in the HighSR session, when it was comparatively easy to earn money: the 
average final returns are 35.47% and 34.64% respectively under the threshold and linear 
bonus schemes. Thus, it seems that the pressure put on the traders to perform well may have 
distracted them from efficient information collection under the threshold scheme, whereas in 
the HighSR session they simply chased the performance wave under both bonus schemes.  
[Insert Table 9 around here] 
As expected, traders’ returns at the end of 50th round are significantly influenced by 
the profitability conditions. The average returns earned at the end of the LowSR and HighSR 
sessions are 11.86% and 35.07% respectively (row 2, Table 9); thus, their difference equals -
23.21% and is statistically significant (t = 8.74, p < 0.01). Under both bonus schemes this 
result remains significant. It should be noted that in the setup of this realistic experiment, 
both the profitability conditions and the bonus schemes have an impact on the total returns 
and hence the traders’ bonus. While the share price and market evolution cannot significantly 
be influenced by traders or their employers, the traders’ compensation schemes are 
nevertheless under the direct control of the companies. 
 
3.5 Robustness checks  
The performance near the end of the trading sessions contains more noise because the traders 
traded less at the end of the trading session. As a robustness check, we compare the average 
returns earned by the traders in the second half of the trading session, i.e., at the end of the 
25th round and later. Table 10 demonstrates that the results are consistent with those 
described in the previous section; the significance levels are much higher because of the 
increased number of observations.  
To investigate whether or not the poorer performance under the threshold scheme is 
driven by lower risk-taking, we compare the average share of wealth invested in the stock for 
each of the four treatments. We find no difference between the average shares of wealth 
invested in the stock by type of bonus scheme (see Table 11). Thus, under the threshold 
scheme, the traders perform worse because they make poorer decisions, and their inferior 
performance does not follow from a difference in risk tolerance.  
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[Insert Tables 10 and 11 around here] 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
To study the impact of different types of bonus schemes on the trading intensity of 
individual traders, we set up an experimental market in which traders sell and buy shares 
without transaction costs. The traders are price takers and are provided with fundamental and 
technical information (evolution of the market index, past share price evolution, realized 
earnings, and analysts’ earnings forecasts). We trade off a basic linear bonus scheme against 
a threshold bonus scheme, both of which reflect the practice in investment banks and 
brokerage houses.  
A first solid finding is that the threshold bonus scheme induces a higher trading 
intensity than a linear bonus scheme. When dissecting trading intensity into two dimensions, 
transaction frequency and transaction size, we document that the threshold scheme does 
indeed induce more aggressive trading behavior in the form of higher transaction frequency, 
but that the transaction size does not depend on the type of bonus scheme.  
We also examine how the context of high and low profitability conditions (periods 
with higher and lower average share price returns) affects trading intensity. High profitability 
leads to a higher trading intensity only under the threshold bonus scheme, which is mainly 
explained by the execution of larger transactions. Considering four treatments consisting of 
the combination of types of bonus scheme and profitability conditions, we conclude that a 
threshold scheme induces frequent trading and trading at higher stakes, especially in trading 
sessions with high profitability conditions. 
 After reaching a return threshold that translates into a higher bonus, traders make 
significantly fewer transactions. Interestingly, the mean number of transactions does not drop 
immediately after the threshold, but in the next intervals, which implies that traders apply a 
5% safety margin above the threshold before they decrease their transaction frequency. 
To estimate the quality of the trading decisions, we examine the difference in the 
share price returns after the traders bought and sold shares as well as their overall 
performance over the whole trading session. If these differences are positive on average, the 
traders make good investments and on average correctly predict/guess the share price 
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movements. We find that the traders make significantly poorer investment decisions under 
the threshold than under the linear bonus scheme. This effect is especially pronounced when 
earning money by trading is relatively difficult (in trading sessions with lower profitability 
conditions). Then, the traders seem to collect more information about the relationships 
between the share price and the market returns, earnings, and earnings forecasts, apply more 
effort to understand those relationships, and finally perform better under the linear bonus 
scheme, whereas under the threshold bonus scheme they seem to focus merely on reaching 
and maintaining threshold returns. Thus, we show that bonuses may be detrimental for 
performance at least when threshold and linear compensation schemes are compared. 
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Figure 1 Payoffs under linear and threshold bonus schemes 
Figure 1 shows the bonus paid under (1a) the linear and (1b) the threshold bonus schemes as a function of the 
total return earned at the end of the 50-round trading session. The total investment (the sum of the periodical 
endowments) at the end of the 50 rounds is E$5,400. 
 
a. Linear bonus scheme 
 
b. Threshold bonus scheme 
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Figure 2 Trading Intensity by bonus scheme and profitability treatments 
Figure 2 shows the average values of Trading Intensity in the four treatments (LinLow, ThresLow, 
LinHigh, and ThresHigh). Trading Intensity equals the number of shares bought divided by the maximum 
number that could be bought plus the number of shares sold divided by the maximum number that could be 
sold. Trading Intensity equals zero if a trader does not trade in the current round.  
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Figure 3 Transaction Frequency by bonus scheme and profitability treatments 
Figure 3 shows the average values of Transaction Frequency the four treatments (LinLow, ThresLow, 
LinHigh, and ThresHigh). Transaction Frequency equals 1 if a trader buys or sells shares in the current 
round (i.e., if a transaction takes place) and 0 otherwise. 
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Figure 4 Transaction Size by bonus scheme and profitability treatments 
Figure 4 shows the average values of Transaction Size in the four treatments (LinLow, ThresLow, LinHigh, 
and ThresHigh). The variable Transaction Size equals the number of shares bought (sold) divided by the 
maximum number of shares the trader could have bought (sold) if a trader buys (sells) shares in the current 
round. 
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Figure 5 Trader performance and transaction frequency under linear and threshold 
bonus schemes 
Figure 5 shows how transaction frequency changes with the total return earned by a trader under (a) the 
linear and (b) the threshold bonus schemes. Each bar depicts the transaction frequency (the mean of 
Transaction Frequency variable) for the given performance percentile.  
Figure 5a Linear bonus scheme 
 
Figure 5b Threshold bonus scheme 
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Table 1 Traders’ rewards and total return earned 
Table 1 shows how the bonus depends on the final total return obtained under the threshold bonus scheme. 
A trader receives no bonus if her total return is negative. If the total return is between 0 and 25%, the bonus 
is 25% of the profit; a return greater than or equal to 25% but lower than 45% yields a bonus of 35%; and a 
return greater than or equal to 45% yields a bonus of 45%. 
Investment 
(sum of 
endowments) 
Value of 
total 
holdings 
(cash and 
share) 
Profit earned for 
trading company 
(E$) 
Total 
return 
(%) 
Bonus rate 
(%) 
Bonus 
(E$) 
Bonus 
(€) 
5,400.00 5,940.00 540.00 10.000 25.00 135.0 2.70 
5,400.00 6,749.99 1,349.99 24.999 25.00 337.5 6.75 
5,400.00 6,750.00 1,350.00 25.000 35.00 472.5 9.45 
5,400.00 7,829.99 2,429.99 44.999 35.00 850.5 17.01 
5,400.00 7,830.00 2,430.00 45.000 45.00 1,093.5 21.87 
5,400.00 8,640.00 3,240.00 60.000 45.00 1,458.0 29.16 
 
Table 2 Stock price returns in High and Low Share Return trading sessions 
Table 2 compares the stock profitability in the HighSR and LowSR sessions. 
Group #obs. 
Total 
returna 
Mean  
return 
Std. 
Dev. Skewness Kurtosis p25 Median p75 
HighSR 
session 50 183.385 2.354 7.183 -0.049 2.776 -1.795 2.027 6.527 
LowSR 
session 50 24.115 0.820 8.941 0.261 3.414 -4.553 -0.000 6.269 
a
 - cumulative stock return at end of trading session, in % 
 
Table 3 Four treatments 
Table 3 describes the four treatments of the experiment. 
LinLow Trading is under the Linear scheme and in the Low Share Return session. 
 
LinHigh Trading is under the Linear scheme and in the High Share Return session. 
 
ThresLow Trading is under the Threshold scheme and in the Low Share Return session.  
 
ThresHigh Trading is under the Threshold scheme and in the High Share Return session. 
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Table 4 Trading Intensity by bonus scheme and profitability treatments 
Table 4 compares the trading activity between the four treatments (LinLow, ThresLow, LinHigh, and 
ThresHigh) in terms of average Trading Intensity. Trading Intensity equals the number of shares bought 
divided by the maximum number that could be bought plus the number of shares sold divided by the 
maximum number that could be sold. Trading Intensity equals zero if a trader does not trade in the current 
round. 
 
Panel A. Mean for Trading Intensity 
  
Session profitability 
  Low & High Low High 
Difference between 
low- and high- 
profitability sessions 
Bo
n
u
s 
sc
he
m
e 
 
Linear & Threshold 
 
0.5159 
 
0.4782 
 
0.5485 
 
   -0.0703*** 
(0.4358) (0.4226) (0.4444) {6.3251} 
[6150] [2850] [3300]  
 
Linear 
0.4927 
Treatment 
LinLow 
0.4555 
Treatment 
LinHigh 
0.5264 -0.0709*** 
(0.4399) (0.4294) (0.4467) {4.4585} 
[3050] [1450] [1600]  
 
Threshold 
0.5387 
Treatment 
ThresLow 
0.5017 
Treatment 
ThresHigh 
0.5692   -0.0675*** 
(0.4305) (0.4142) (0.4413) {4.3581} 
[3100] [1400] [1700]  
Difference between 
linear and threshold 
schemes 
-0.0460*** -0.0462*** -0.0428***  
{4.1476} {2.9220} {2.7694}  
    
The cells contain the means, (standard deviations), and [number of observations]. The right-hand column 
and the bottom row give the differences between the means of the different groups and the {t-statistics}.  
* stands for p<0.10, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01 
Note: Higher means indicate a higher average trading intensity during the trading session. 
 
Panel B. ANOVA for Trading Intensity: Variance measure 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F P-value 
ThresBS 1.521 1 1.521 8.08 0.005 
HighSR 3.824 1 3.824 20.31 0.000 
ThresBS x HighSR 0.004 1 0.004 0.02 0.879 
Residual 1157.149 6146 0.188   
Total 1167.731 6149 0.190   
 
  
31 
Table 5 Transaction Frequency by bonus scheme and profitability treatments 
Table 5 compares the trading activity between the four treatments (LinLow, ThresLow, LinHigh, and 
ThresHigh) in terms of the average Transaction Frequency. Transaction Frequency equals 1 if a trader buys 
or sells shares in the current round (i.e. if a transaction takes place) and 0 otherwise. 
 
Panel A. Mean for Transaction Frequency 
  
Session profitability 
  Low & High Low High 
Difference between 
low- and high- 
profitability sessions 
Bo
n
u
s 
sc
he
m
e 
 
Linear & Threshold 
 
0.7914 
 
0.7909 
 
0.7918 
 
-0.001 
(0.4064) (0.4067) (0.4061) {0.0905} 
[6150] [2850] [3300]  
 
Linear 
0.7567 
Treatment 
LinLow 
0.7441 
Treatment 
LinHigh 
0.7681 -0.0240 
(0.4291) (0.4365) (0.4221) {1.5420} 
[3050] [1450] [1600]  
 
Threshold 
0.8255 
Treatment 
ThresLow 
0.8393 
Treatment 
ThresHigh 
0.8141 0.0252* 
(0.3796) (0.3674) (0.3891) {1.8377} 
[3100] [1400] [1700]  
Difference between 
linear and threshold 
schemes 
   -0.0688***     -0.0951***    -0.0460***  
{6.6583} {6.2850} {3.2565}  
    
Cells contain means, (standard deviations), and [number of observations]. The right-hand column and the 
bottom row give the differences between the means of the different groups and the {t-statistics}.  
* stands for p<0.10, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01 
Note: Higher means indicate a higher transaction frequency (more transactions made) during the trading 
session. 
 
Panel B. ANOVA for Transaction Frequency: Variance measure 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F P-value 
ThresBS 6.448 1 6.448 39.35 0.000 
HighSR 0.438 1 0.438 2.67 0.102 
ThresBS x HighSR 0.923 1 0.923 5.63 0.018 
Residual 1007.150 6146 0.164   
Total 1015.343 6149 0.165   
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Table 6 Transaction Size by bonus scheme and profitability treatments 
Table 6 compares the trading activity between the four treatments (LinLow, ThresLow, LinHigh, and 
ThresHigh) in terms of the average Transaction Size. The variable Transaction Size equals the number of 
shares bought (sold) divided by the maximum number of shares the trader could have bought (sold) if a 
trader buys (sells) shares in the current round. 
 
Panel A. Mean for Transaction Size 
  
Session profitability 
  Low & High Low High 
Difference between 
low- and high- 
profitability sessions 
Bo
n
u
s 
sc
he
m
e 
 
Linear & Threshold 
 
0.6519 
 
0.6046 
 
0.6927 
     
    -0.0880*** 
(0.3890) (0.3864) (0.3866) {7.9213} 
[4867] [2254] [2613]  
 
Linear 
0.6511 
Treatment 
LinLow 
0.6121 
Treatment 
LinHigh 
0.6853 -0.0731*** 
(0.3907) (0.3898) (0.3884) {4.5092} 
[2308] [1079] [1229] 
 
 
Threshold 
0.6526 
Treatment 
ThresLow 
0.5978 
Treatment 
ThresHigh 
0.6992     -0.1014*** 
(0.3875) (0.3834) (0.3850) {6.6527} 
[2559] [1175] [1370] 
 
Difference between 
linear and threshold 
schemes 
   -0.0015    0.0143 -0.0139  
{0.1374} {0.8800} {0.9161}  
    
Cells contain means, (standard deviations), and [number of observations]. The right-hand column and the 
bottom row give the differences between the means of the different groups and the {t-statistics}.  
* stands for p<0.10, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01 
Note: Higher means indicate a larger transaction size during the trading session. 
 
Panel B. ANOVA for Transaction Size: Variance measure 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F P-value 
ThresBS 0.116 1 0.116 0.77 0.379 
HighSR 3.078 1 3.078 20.60 0.000 
ThresBS x HighSR 0.240 1 0.240 1.61 0.204 
Residual 726.632 4863 0.149   
Total 736.248 4866 0.151   
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Table 7 Trading Activity, Transaction Frequency and Transaction Size 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trading 
Intensity  
(Tobit) 
 
 
Trading 
Intensity 
(Tobit):  
With 
Thresholds 
Transaction 
Frequency 
(Logit) 
 
 
Transaction 
Frequency 
(Logit): With 
Thresholds 
 
Transaction 
Size  
(Tobit) 
 
 
Transaction 
Size (Tobit): 
With 
Thresholds 
 
ThresBS 0.074*** 0.077*** 0.575*** 0.597*** -0.015 -0.014 (0.019) (0.019) (0.096) (0.096) (0.015) (0.015) 
HighSR 0.020 0.010 -0.013 -0.060 0.019 0.017 (0.023) (0.023) (0.106) (0.107) (0.018) (0.018) 
ThresBS x HighSR -0.008 0.012 -0.272** -0.167 0.038* 0.044** (0.027) (0.027) (0.130) (0.134) (0.021) (0.021) 
Return [30%, 35%] 
 0.049 0.347* -0.007 
(0.042)  (0.206)  (0.034) 
Return [50%, 55%] 
 
-0.051 -0.271 0.008 
(0.079)  (0.293)  (0.062) 
Return [30%, 35%] 
x ThresBS 
-0.128** -0.738*** -0.023 
(0.061)  (0.284)  (0.049) 
Return [50%, 55%] 
x ThresBS 
-0.298*** -0.914** -0.156** 
(0.104)  (0.379)  (0.079) 
Total Return to 
Date 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001** -0.001* 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in Total 
Return 
-0.005** -0.005** -0.012 -0.012 -0.004** -0.004** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
Average % in Stock 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.004* 0.004* 0.009*** 0.009*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock Return 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.016** 0.015** 0.005*** 0.005*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market Return 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.018** 0.020** 0.003* 0.003* (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) 
Earnings Return 0.003 0.003 0.012 0.013 0.001 0.001 (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) 
Forecasted Earnings 
Return 
0.002 0.002 0.012 0.012 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) 
Round number -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.001*** -0.001*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.095*** 0.089*** 1.290*** 1.257* 0.234*** 0.233*** (0.026) (0.026) (0.135) (0.135 (0.021) (0.021) 
Sigma 0.503*** 0.502*** 0.359*** 0.359*** (0.005) (0.005)   (0.004) (0.004) 
Observations 6027 6027 6027 6027 4766 4766 
Pseudo R-squared 0.055 0.058 0.020 0.025 0.178 0.180 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** stand for p<0.10, p<0.05, and p<0.01, respectively. 
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Table 8 Quality of investment decisions made by traders by bonus scheme and 
profitability treatments 
 
Table 8 compares the investment decision quality between the four treatments (LinLow, ThresLow, 
LinHigh, and ThresHigh) in terms of Return Difference. Return Difference is equal to an average share 
price return for the rounds after purchases minus an average share price return for the rounds after sales.  
 
Panel A. Mean for Return Difference 
  
Session profitability 
  Low & High Low High 
Difference between 
low- and high-
profitability sessions 
Bo
n
u
s 
sc
he
m
e 
 
Linear & Threshold 
 
0.9649 
 
1.5760 
 
0.4290 
 
    1.1470** 
(2.5758) (2.7486) (3.3040) {2.5070} 
[122] [57] [65]  
 
Linear 
 
 
1.5859 
Treatment 
LinLow 
2.2742 
Treatment 
LinHigh 
0.9421 1.3320** 
(2.3176) (2.4789) (1.9854) {2.3046} 
[60] [29] [31] 
 
 
Threshold 
 
 
0.3640 
Treatment 
ThresLow 
0.8530 
Treatment 
ThresHigh 
-0.0388     0.8918 
(2.6868) (2.8690) (2.4978) {1.3082} 
[62] [28] [34] 
 
Difference between 
linear and threshold 
schemes 
1.2220***    1.4212** 0.9809*  
{2.6862} {2.0033} {1.7414}  
    
Cells contain means, (standard deviations), and [number of observations]. The right-hand column and the 
bottom row give the differences between the means of the different groups and the {t-statistics}.  
* stands for p<0.10, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01 
Note: Higher means indicate a higher difference between the share price returns after a purchase and after a 
sale, i.e., a higher quality of investment decisions. 
 
Panel B. ANOVA for Return Difference: Variance measure 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F P-value 
ThresBS 28.772 1 28.772 4.73 0.0317 
HighSR 26.585 1 26.585 4.37 0.0388 
ThresBS x HighSR 1.470 1 1.470 0.24 0.6241 
Residual 718.445 118 6.089   
Total 802.774 121 6.634   
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Table 9 Returns earned by traders at end of trading session by bonus scheme and 
profitability treatments 
Table 9 compares the average returns earned by the traders at the end of the trading session for the four 
treatments (LinLow, ThresLow, LinHigh, and ThresHigh). The variable Final Total Return is the return 
earned by a trader at the end of the trading session and equals Total Return at the 50th round. 
 
Panel A. Mean for Final Total Return 
  
Session profitability 
  Low & High Low High 
Difference between 
low- and high- 
profitability sessions 
Bo
n
u
s 
sc
he
m
e 
 
Linear & Threshold 
 
24.31 
 
11.86 
 
35.07 
 
    -23.21*** 
(18.67) (12.12) (16.57) {8.745} 
[123] [57] [66]  
 
Linear 
 
 
25.16 
Treatment 
LinLow 
14.70 
Treatment 
LinHigh 
34.64 -19.94*** 
(18.06) (12.20) (17.38) {5.136} 
[61] [29] [32] 
 
 
Threshold 
 
 
23.48 
Treatment 
ThresLow 
8.92 
Treatment 
ThresHigh 
35.47     -26.55*** 
(19.37) (11.53) (16.02) {7.341} 
[62] [28] [34] 
 
Difference between 
linear and threshold 
schemes 
1.67    5.78* -0.84  
{0.496} {1.837} {0.204}  
    
Cells contain means, (standard deviations), and [number of observations]. The right-hand column and the 
bottom row give the differences between the means of the different groups and the {t-statistics}.  
* stands for p<0.10, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01 
Note: Higher means indicate higher returns earned by the traders at the end of a trading session. 
 
Panel B. ANOVA for Final Total Return: Variance measure 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F P-value 
ThresBS 475.654 1 475.654 2.21 0.1395 
HighSR 6048.963 1 6048.963 28.14 0.0000 
ThresBS x HighSR 334.378 1 334.378 1.56 0.2144 
Residual 25583.293 119 214.986   
Total 42546.520 122 348.742   
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Table 10 Returns earned by traders in second half (at the end of 25th round and 
later) of trading session 
Table 10 compares the average returns earned by the traders in the second half of the trading session (at the 
25th round and later) between the four treatments (LinLow, ThresLow, LinHigh, and ThresHigh) in terms 
of Total Return to Date. Total Return to Date is equal to return earned by a trader from the beginning of the 
trading session to the current round, in percentage points. 
 
Panel A. Mean for Total Return to Date 
  
Session profitability 
  Low & High Low High 
Difference between 
low- and high-
profitability sessions 
Bo
n
u
s 
sc
he
m
e 
 
Linear & Threshold 
 
26.59 
 
10.15 
 
40.80 
 
    -30.65*** 
(22.52) (12.67) (19.26) {52.275} 
[3198] [1482] [1716]  
 
Linear 
 
28.06 
Treatment 
LinLow 
12.35 
Treatment 
LinHigh 
42.30 -29.95*** 
(22.72) (12.51) (20.38) {34.846} 
[1586] [754] [832] 
 
 
Threshold 
 
25.15 
Treatment 
ThresLow 
7.87 
Treatment 
ThresHigh 
39.38     -31.52*** 
(22.23) (12.44) (18.04) {39.96} 
[1612] [728] [884] 
 
Difference between 
linear and threshold 
schemes 
2.92***    4.48*** 2.92***  
{3.664} {6.914} {3.147}  
    
Cells contain means, (standard deviations), and [number of observations]. The right-hand column and the 
bottom row give the differences between the means of the different groups and the {t-statistics}.  
* stands for p<0.10, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01 
Note: Higher means indicate higher returns earned by the traders. 
 
Panel B. ANOVA for Total Return to Date: Variance measure 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F P-value 
ThresBS 7438.935 1 7438.935 27.54 0.0000 
HighSR 354910.074 1 354910.074 1313.92 0.0000 
ThresBS x HighSR 484.777 1 484.777 1.79 0.1804 
Residual 862749.350 3194 270.116   
Total 1620988.820 3197 507.034   
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Table 11 Share of wealth invested by traders in stock 
Table 11 compares the average share of wealth invested by the traders in the stock between the four 
treatments (LinLow, ThresLow, LinHigh, and ThresHigh) in terms of Average % in Stock. The variable 
Average % in Stock is average percentage of a trader’s wealth invested in the stock over the trading 
session. 
 
Panel A. Mean for Average % in Stock 
  
Session profitability 
  Low & High Low High 
Difference between 
low- and high- 
profitability sessions 
Bo
n
u
s 
sc
he
m
e 
 
Linear & Threshold 
 
47.95 
 
44.65 
 
50.80 
 
-6.15*** 
(35.24) (35.14) (35.08) {6.8486} 
[6150] [2850] [3300]  
 
Linear  48.02 
Treatment 
LinLow 
44.41 
Treatment 
LinHigh 
51.30 -6.88*** 
(36.00) (36.73) (35.02) {5.2969} 
[3050] [1450] [1600] 
 
 
Threshold  47.89 
Treatment 
ThresLow 
44.90 
Treatment 
ThresHigh 
50.34 5.43*** 
(22.23) (33.41) (35.08) {4.3792} 
[3100] [1400] [1700] 
 
Difference between 
linear and threshold 
schemes 
0.14 -0.49 0.96  
{0.1541} {0.3753} {0.7843}  
    
Cells contain means, (standard deviations), and [number of observations]. The right-hand column and the 
bottom row give the differences between the means of the different groups and the {t-statistics}.  
* stands for p<0.10, ** for p<0.05, and *** for p<0.01 
Note: Higher means indicate percentages of traders’ wealth invested in the stock during a trading session. 
 
Panel B. ANOVA for Average % in Stock: Variance measure 
Source 
Sum of 
Squares Df 
Mean 
Square F P-value 
ThresBS 173.978 1 173.978 0.14 0.7072 
HighSR 36051.654 1 36051.654 29.25 0.0000 
ThresBS x HighSR 806.227 1 806.227 0.65 0.4187 
Residual 7575727.550 6146 1232.627   
Total 7634460.860 6149 1241.578   
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Appendix A. Instructions 
Appendix A contains instructions for the trading session under the linear bonus scheme. The instructions 
under the threshold scheme are identical, except for the calculation of the reward. 
 
This experiment will last about 1.5 hours and will consist of:  
1. These instructions and a short quiz;  
2. 20 rounds training session; 
3. Twice a trading session of 50 rounds; 
4. Final questionnaire. 
Experimental market 
You will buy and sell shares on behalf of a trading company “Aurum”, which will provide you 
with cash necessary for trading. The amount of cash given to you is called investment. In the 1st 
round of each trading session you receive E$500 (experimental dollars) from Aurum. In each 
further round of the session you will get an additional E$100.  
Your goal is to maximize Aurum’s total return, the ratio of additional money you earn to the 
investment. You are free to decide how many shares to buy or sell. Choose the optimal trading 
strategy and buy shares at low prices, sell them at high prices. 
Buying and selling shares 
Using cash you will be able to buy and sell shares of one company, let’s call it “Egias”. You can 
sell/hold previously purchased shares or buy additional ones. Shares and cash together constitute 
your holdings in every round. You will start with 0 shares. So in the first round you cannot sell 
shares; you can only buy shares. The maximum number of shares you can buy multiplied by the 
current share price cannot exceed your current cash holdings. See Example 1. 
Example 1 
► You have E$119 in cash and the current share price is E$30.  
The maximum number of shares you can buy equals 3, as 3 x E$30 = E$90 < E$119.  
You cannot buy 4 shares as 4 x E$30 = E$120 > $E119.  
If you buy 3 shares, then E$29 is left in your cash holdings. ◄ 
When you buy shares: 
• your cash holdings are reduced by the number of shares bought multiplied by the current 
share price; 
• your share holdings (or shares’ value) are increased by the same amount; 
• the number of shares you own increases by the number of shares bought.  
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When you sell shares: 
• your cash holdings are increased and your share holdings are decreased by the number of 
shares sold multiplied by the current share price;  
• the number of shares you own decreases by the number of shares sold.  
If you do not buy nor sell any shares, then the number of shares you own stays the same, but the 
value of your shares may increase or decrease depending on the share price movement. See 
example 2. 
Example 2 
►In the beginning of the current round you own 20 shares and E$1,000 cash. The current share 
price is E$10.  
The share holdings are 20xE$10 = E$200 and the total holdings are E$1,200. 
You buy 10 more shares at the current price and spend E$100 cash such that you have E$900 left 
(E$900 = E$1,000 - E$100). 
In the next round the share price rises up to E$15 and your share holdings equal 30 shares x E$15 
= E$450.  
In the beginning of the next round you will have E$1000 in cash because you also receive E$100 
extra cash from Aurum in the beginning of each round.  
Your total holdings are E$1450 = E$1000 (cash) + E$450 (shares). 
  Cash 
holdings 
Share 
holdings 
Number of 
shares owned 
Total 
holdings 
Share 
price 
Beginning of the current round E$1,000 E$200 20 shares E$1,200 E$10 
Your decision: +10 shares 
End of the current round E$900 E$300 30 shares E$1,200 E$10 
In the beginning of the next round, the share price goes up by E$5   
Beginning of the next round E$1,000 E$450 30 shares E$1,450 E$15 
◄ 
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Trading stage 
Every trading round starts with a trading stage, where you can buy and/or sell shares. 
Screenshot of a trading stage 
 
This screen shows the information helpful in your investment decisions:  
• Egias’ share price,  
• the market index,  
• Egias’ earnings information (past and forecast),  
• your current holdings and performance;  
• in the same screen you can make your investment decisions.  
The upper right corner of the screen shows the time remaining for your decision in the current 
round. The screen will appear for 15 seconds. Within 15 seconds you must specify your decision 
whether you want to buy or sell shares. If you do not reach any decision within 15 sec, you will 
proceed to the next round with your share holdings unchanged.  
To the left you see past Egias’ earnings and earnings forecast.  You also see percentage changes 
in earnings and earnings forecasts from the last past round and the graphs of historical values of 
earnings and earnings forecasts (up to 12 past rounds), which give you a broader picture and 
could allow you to identify a link between earnings and their forecasts.  
► Company’s earnings are an after-tax profit (or loss), which a company produces during a 
specific time period. For example, Egias calculates and reports its earnings every three rounds. In 
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some periods companies generate profit (and their earnings are positive), whereas in other periods 
companies can incur losses (earnings are negative). On the screen you see Egias’ earnings per 
share (earnings divided by the number of shares outstanding, which is constant throughout all 
sessions).  
► An earnings forecast is value of earnings expected by analysts for the next period. Analyst is a 
person who studies company’s accounts, strategy, and economic outlook. On the screen you see 
the average expected value from many analysts.  
In the right bottom corner you see the current market index value, its percentage change from the 
last past round, and a graph of its historical values (up to 12 past rounds).  
► The market index measures the price changes of the overall stock market, which consists of all 
publicly traded companies. Changes in the market index reflect changes in the whole economy. 
For example, a recession is typically accompanied by a drop in the market index and the 
economic expansion goes along with an increase in the market index. 
The share price may be influenced by past earnings, earnings forecast, and by the market index 
movements, but the degree of this relation may in some time periods be strong or weak and may 
occasionally be inversed. 
In the right upper corner you see the current share price, its percentage change and the graph of 
its historical values (up to 12 past rounds).  
The central part of the screen contains the following four boxes (down): 
1. Round shows the current round and the total number of rounds in the current trading 
session.  
2. Performance shows your current reward, the total return you earned for Aurum and the 
total investment you received from Aurum. 
3. Holdings shows your current cash and share holdings, including the number of shares 
owned. Total holdings equal the sum of cash and share value. 
4. Decision, where you can specify the number of shares you want to buy or sell.  
a. If you want to buy shares, specify the number you want to buy in the upper blue 
box. Leave it blank if you don’t want to buy any shares. 
b. If you want to sell shares, specify the number you want to sell in the lower blue 
box. Leave it blank if you don’t want to sell any shares. 
c. If you don’t want to buy nor sell any shares, leave both blue boxes blank. 
d. Press the button “Do it!” when you are ready with your investment decisions and 
you will automatically proceed to the next round. If you don’t press the button 
before the time is over, then your decisions will not be executed. 
 
The experimental stock market employs real historical share price, earnings, earnings forecast, 
and market index data. So it is fully independent from your decisions/performance or the 
decisions/performance of other participants.  
Reward calculation 
For your services you will receive a reward. It depends on your own performance: the more you 
earn for Aurum, the more you get as a reward. Your reward is calculated at the end of each 
trading session and constitutes a fixed percent, 35% of the additional money
holdings - investment) you earned for Aurum over the entire 50 rounds. 
If total return > 0, then reward = (holdings 
If total return is negative, then your reward is zero. 
Total return = (holdings – investment) / i
Example 3 
►After 50 rounds your holdings (combined in cash and shares) equal E$7,400, whereas the total 
investment from Aurum was E$5,400. 
So you have earned E$7,400 
return is E$2,000 / E$5,400 = 32.07% > 0. 
Your reward is E$2,000 x 35% = E$700 = 
Below is a graph of the final reward depending on total return you earn for Aurum at the end of 
the trading session. 
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 (additional money = 
 
- investment) x 35% 
 
nvestment 
 
- E$5,400 = E$2,000 of additional money for Aurum and the total 
 
€14. ◄ 
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Performance stage 
After the decision stage you will be shown a screen with your performance to date (resulting from 
the previous rounds) for 2 sec. Your current reward, the total return earned for Aurum, and 
investment will appear in the upper box of the screen. In the lower box you will see a graphical 
representation of your reward depending on the total return earned for Aurum. On the graph the 
x-axis is the total return earned for Aurum, and the y-axis is your reward. Two arrows show your 
current performance in terms of reward and the total return earned for Aurum.  
Screenshot of a performance stage  
 
Final payoff 
You earn €2 for showing up. The variable part of your payment depends on your performance 
during the experiment. Your final payoff will be randomly chosen from two rewards earned in the 
two trading sessions.  
For example, 
• E$650 (€13) is your reward in the 1st trading session 
• E$800 (€16) is your reward in the 2nd trading session 
One trading session will be randomly selected to determine your payment. You will be paid your 
total reward in cash and in private at the end of the experiment. 
Now you will start with a training session, which aims to familiarize you with the experimental 
environment and does not count towards your final payment. 
  
44 
Appendix B. Variable definitions 
Variable name Description 
Average % in Stock  Average percentage of a trader’s wealth invested in the stock over the 
trading session. 
Change in Total Return Difference between total return earned by a trader from the beginning of 
the trading session to the current round (Total Return to Date) and total 
return earned from the beginning of the trading session to the previous 
round, in percentage points. 
Earnings Return Return in earnings relative to previous round (current versus previous 
round), in percentage points. 
Final Total Return Return earned by a trader at the end of the trading session, which equals 
Total Return at the 50th round 
Forecasted Earnings Return Most recent forecasted earnings return (current versus previous round), 
in percentage points. 
HighSR Dummy for the high-stock-return session, which equals 1 if the current 
trading session has high-profitability conditions and 0 otherwise. 
Market Return Most recent return of the market index (current versus previous round), 
in percentage points. 
Return [30%, 35%] Dummy variable, which equals 1 when a trader’s Total Return to Date is 
between 30% and 40%. 
Return [50%, 55%] Dummy variable, which equals 1 when a trader’s Total Return to Date is 
between 50% and 60%. 
Return [30%, 35%] x ThresBS Interaction term between Return [30%, 40%] and ThresBS.  
Return [50%, 55%] x ThresBS Interaction term between Return [50%, 60%] and ThresBS.  
Return Difference Average share price return for the rounds after purchases minus average 
share price return for the rounds after sales. 
Round Number Number of the current trading round. 
ThresBS Dummy for the threshold bonus scheme, which equals 1 if in the current 
trading session a trader operates under the threshold scheme and zero for 
the linear bonus scheme. 
ThresBS x HighSR Interaction term between ThresBS and HighSR. 
Total Return to Date Total return earned by a trader from the beginning of the trading session 
to the current round, in percentage points. 
Trading Intensity The number of shares bought divided by the maximum number that 
could be bought plus the number of shares sold divided by the maximum 
number that could be sold. 
Transaction Frequency Dummy variable, which equals 1 if a trader buys or sells shares in the 
current round (i.e., if a transaction takes place) and 0 otherwise. 
Transaction Size Number of shares bought (sold) divided by the maximum number of 
shares the trader could have bought (sold) if a trader buys (sells) shares 
in the current round.  
Stock Return Most recent stock return (current versus previous round), in percentage 
points. 
 
